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1. IntroductIon
Implementation of Article 12 of the Convention of the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD) is one of the most critical issues in disability rights nowadays. It 
has been quite difficult for many to grasp its implementation. That is why any reform 
on the matter gets immediate attention from the disability rights scholarly community. 
Peru’s Civil Code Reform has been praised as the most CRPD-compliant normative 
modification regarding legal capacity of people with disabilities by experts (Minkowitz, 
2018), international organizations (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 2018) 
and in academia (Martinez Pujalte, 2019, p. 4).
Peru’s traditional disability-based substitute decision-making regime was 
completely eliminated via Legislative Decree 1384, published on September 4, 2018. 
This article will analyze the Reform’s legal text to assess its compliance with the CRPD.2 
In doing so, I will try to assess the challenges that remain in order to achieve a full 
recognition of legal capacity of persons with disabilities in Peru. I will also assess the 
impact the Reform has had on the concept of free will and how this affects the basic tenets 
of Private Law.
Therefore, this paper will have the following structure: (i) a reference to previous 
developments in Peruvian law, followed by an analysis of the most important reforms 
regarding: (ii) legal capacity; (iii) support; and (iv) safeguards. After that, I will analyze 
(v) how the Reform interacts with the concept of free will stated in the theory of juridical 
acts. Next, I will address the issues that were not modified by the Reform and that are 
related to the full recognition of the legal capacity of persons with disabilities. Finally, I 
will present some conclusions and final comments.
2.  PrevIous develoPments regardIng legal caPacIty of Persons wIth 
dIsabIlItIes In InternatIonal human rIghts law and PeruvIan law
In this section I will provide some context for the reader on the Peruvian Civil 
Code Reform and the efforts from the State and civil society that allowed for this Reform.
2 For the most part, I will use SODIS’ translation of the text of the Reform. I believe it is a great translation, 
but I have some reservations. For example, in article 221, the translation uses “voidability” for the term 
“nulidad”. I prefer the use of “voidness” because it shows that the act never existed. “Voidability” would 
be more like “anulabilidad”, a Civil Law term that indicates that an act could be void but also confirmed. 
The translation can be found here: http://www.chrusp.org/file/340835/Legislative_Decree_No_1384__
Peruvian_legal_capacity_reform_.docx
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2.1. A brief reference to legal capacity in international human rights law.
Article 12 CRPD is entitled “Equal recognition before the law” and it has 5 sections: 
legal personhood (passive capacity), legal capacity (capacity to act), supports, safeguards 
and access to property and financial services. This means that States “shall recognize that 
persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects 
of life” (Article 12.2). According to the CRPD Committee’s General Comment 1, legal 
capacity “recognizes the person as an agent who can perform acts with legal effect” (2014, 
para. 16). Therefore “States must holistically examine all areas of law to ensure that the 
right of persons with disabilities to legal capacity is not restricted on an unequal basis 
with others” (CRPD Committee, 2014, para. 7). This does not mean that any restrictions 
are forbidden. It means that they cannot be based on a disability. Then, disability-neutral3 
reasons such as “bankruptcy or criminal conviction” are allowed (CRPD Committee, 
2014, para. 32) as long as they do not violate other human rights.
The text of Article 12 made it clear that disability could not be a reason to deny 
legal capacity. However, the understanding of this statement was not clear for everyone. 
Many argued that in certain cases, when the person with a disability does not understand 
or cannot act on that understanding, there should be some space for disability-based 
substitute decision-making (Del Villar, 2015; Dawson, 2015). However, the Committee 
decided that the functional approach “is flawed for two key reasons: (a) it is discriminatorily 
applied to people with disabilities; and (b) it presumes to be able to accurately assess the 
inner-workings of the human mind and, when the person does not pass the assessment, 
it then denies him or her a core human right — the right to equal recognition before the 
law” (CRPD Committee, 2014, para. 15). This debate, as well as others, will inform my 
analysis throughout the paper.
2.2. A brief reference to the legal context in Peru
Peru is a continental law jurisdiction. This means that judges are not as open to 
innovation as they might be in common law jurisdictions.4 Consequently, reforms usually 
require new legislation, as judges are not able to modify legislation, and are not too keen 
to interpret existing legislation in a way that would disrupt the status quo either, even when 
doing so may be justified. This is relevant in regard to the Reform on legal capacity, since 
CRPD was automatically Law in Peru since 2008. Even though CRPD was automatically 
Law in Peru and had priority over acts and statutes, few judges, if any, were willing to 
apply Article 12 before the Civil Code Reform.
Another relevant issue is access to information regarding the application of 
Article 12. Most of the literature on Article 12 (Bhailís, Clíona and Flynn, 2017) and its 
implementation (Dhanda, 2017, p. 88) has been written in English, and has focused on 
3 It is important to mention that the concept of ‘disability -neutral’ does not have a widely understood 
meaning. For a proposal see (Flynn & Arstein-Kerslake, 2017) and for a criticism see (Minkowitz, 2017, 
pp. 81–84)
4 For a comparison between legal systems, see David, 1978.
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the experience of First World countries (Dhanda, 2017, p. 88). As Dhanda has stated, this 
usually makes it difficult for developing countries to vie for reform, because the usual 
excuse put forward by legislators is that “the resources available in First World countries 
are not available” for our countries, and thus reforms cannot be implemented (Dhanda, 
2017, p. 88).
Nevertheless, Peru managed to implement its reform. Although the reform caught 
most people by surprise, it did not happen overnight – we can track a series of actions that 
led up to its approval (International Disability Alliance, 2017, pp. 17-20). Peru ratified 
the CRPD in 2008. During the State’s first appearance before the UN CRPD Committee, 
the Committee stated that Peru’s legislation was not in conformity with Article 12 (CRPD 
Committee, 2012, para. 24). This was not an unusual conclusion for the Committee, as 
few – if any – legislations around the world actually allow for full supported decision 
making. In fact, it is important to note that the Committee has not found any national 
legislation to be fully CRPD compliant (Dinerstein, Grewal and Martinis, 2016, p. 448). At 
the time, Peru’s legislation allowed for substitute decision - making. It also discriminated 
against “deaf-mute, blind-deaf and blind-mute persons, as well as mentally handicapped 
persons and those suffering from mental deterioration” (CRPD Committee, 2012, para. 
26). Since then, there have been several changes regarding legal capacity of persons with 
disabilities, both in the legislative framework and in judicial practice.
2.3. Legislative developments
Prior to this reform, there were some attempts to recognize the legal capacity of 
persons with disabilities. The Person with Disabilities Act 2012, Law 29973,5 recognized 
the legal capacity of persons with disabilities. However, the Act did not modify the Civil 
Code, so this recognition did not have an impact on the recognition of legal capacity in the 
system.6 As the current UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
has stated, it had more of a declarative value (Devandas, 2017, para. 40). Thus, as the 
Act had not removed most legal restrictions in hierarchically superior norms that denied 
legal capacity to persons with mental disabilities, it did not effectively align Peruvian 
legislation with article 12 of the CRPD. It did, however, have a limited effect, insofar as it 
eliminated provisions against the deaf-mute, blind-deaf and blind-mute persons.7
5 Enacted by Law 29973, The Person with Disabilities Act, published on 24 December 2012.
6 In fact, the Person with Disabilities Act 2012, 29973, stated that: “Article 9 – Equal recognition as persons 
before the law 9.1 Persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects 
of life. The Civil Code regulates the support systems and reasonable accommodations they require for 
decision making. 3 9.2 The State ensures persons with disabilities their right to own property, to inherit, to 
access and freely contract for insurance, bank loans, mortgages and other forms of financial credits, on an 
equal basis with others. Likewise, it ensures their right to marry and to freely decide on the exercise of their 
sexuality and fertility.” The translation comes from this website: http://www.internationaldisabilityalliance.
org/sites/default/files/documents/peru_general_law_on_persons_with_disabilities.english.pdf
7 “Mute” is considered an offensive term for deaf and hard of hearing persons. However, it is the literal term 
used by the previous legislation.
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Despite falling short of proper reform, the Act did create a Special Committee for the 
reform of the Civil Code 1984, which drafted a bill on the matter.8 Civil society, academia 
and public officers were all represented in this Committee. Due to time constraints, the 
bill did not address every aspect covered by Article 12 and thus would have failed to 
implement a proper, Article 12-complaint, Civil Code Reform. Ultimately, the bill did not 
pass, because the congressperson could not argue for the text when confronted against 
criticism and doubts. It did, however, serve as the basis for Proposal 872/2016, bill drafted 
by civil society that received multi-party support and it is safe to say that this last document 
was the main input for the Legislative Decree 1384.9
Reforming the Civil Code 1984 has been a long and tedious process. Most 
congresspersons and their advisors were not fully aware of the implications of Article 
12. Many of them wanted to improve conditions for persons with disabilities but doubted 
that recognizing full legal capacity was the correct path to doing so. Civil society, on the 
other hand, made several unsuccessful pushes for the Proposal’s approval. Most Private 
Law scholars were absent from the debate and the majority of those who did participate, 
opposed the Proposal (Bolaños Salazar, 2018, pp. 124-128). I believe that their opposition 
came from an unwillingness to challenge any concept of Private Law like discernment. 
One of them actually wrote, during another attempt to modify the Civil Code: “At this 
point of my life, what I do not understand is wrong” (Castillo Freyre, 2005, p. 38).
During this time, there was a desire from government to change things, but no 
clear guide on how to proceed. The Executive Branch’s Legislative Decree on additional 
simplification measures for administrative affairs 2017, Decree 1310 is proof of this.10 
The Decree aimed to facilitate the process through which older persons could access 
their retirement pensions. At the time, as guardianship laws were still in place, financial 
institutions would demand a guardianship ruling before granting a person access to their 
pension. As the court procedure was long and often expensive, the Decree allowed for a 
notary procedure to appoint a guardian, applicable only to these cases.
Four days after the Civil Code’s Reform, the Decree was modified via Legislative 
Decree for the inclusion of persons with disabilities 2018, Decree 1417, which eliminated 
all references to guardianship and changed them for references to supports.11 However, the 
8 The Committee members were: Congresspersons Jhon Reynaga and Rosa Mavila; President of the 
National Council for the Integration of Persons with Disabilities (CONADIS); representative of the Judicial 
Branch, representative of the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú School of Law, representative of 
the Office of the Ombudsperson, representative of the National Registry of Identification and Civil Status 
(RENIEC); and three representatives of civil society from Alamo Perú (organization of persons with 
psychosocial disabilities), Sociedad Peruana de Síndrome Down (organization of relatives of persons with 
Down Syndrome) and Sociedad y Discapacidad - SODIS, a human rights organization specialized on the 
rights of persons with disabilities.
9 In the Peruvian legal framework, a legislative decree is an act of the Executive Branch with the same power 
and validity of an Act of Congress, since it is developed under the explicit permission of the Parliament.
10 Legislative Decree 1310 on additional simplification measures for administrative affairs, published on 
December 30th 2018.
11 Legislative Decree for the inclusion of persons with disabilities, published on September 13th 2018.
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Decree now establishes a procedure for appointing supports, and safeguard measures, that are 
applicable only to these cases and differ from the general supported decision-making regime.
Parallel to this, the Executive Branch decided to recognize “supports” within a 
public policy that awarded non-contributive pensions to persons with severe disabilities 
living in poverty.12 As I mentioned prior, most institutions required a person with a 
disability to provide a guardianship ruling in order to access a pension. Since most people 
who qualified for this pension live in rural areas, it was essentially impossible for them 
to initiate a guardianship procedure before a judge or notary, due to the lack of accessible 
services. In light of this, the Ministry of Inclusion and Social Development stipulated that 
another person could receive the money, provided that he or she lived with the person with 
a disability and could later prove that the money was used for the care of the person with 
a disability, a measure that could be seen as safeguard.13 Although these persons could be 
construed as supports, this law established yet another form of support that, in this case, 
did not consider the will of the person with a disability. In conclusion, there were different 
and opposing measures regarding legal capacity before the Reform.
2.4. Judicial developments
There have also been some judicial cases that dealt with legal capacity prior to 
the Reform. At the highest level, the Constitutional Court has not properly understood 
the social model of disability and its implications until the Reform (Verano, Constantino 
and Bregaglio, 2018, p. 20). In 2009, in a case regarding the placement of a person with a 
disability in a care home by a guardian,14 the Constitutional Court argued that the protection 
of persons with disabilities does not mean that “persons who suffer mental disabilities 
lack a will or that their will has no value” (2009, para. 4). The Court also argued that 
“mental disability is not a synonym, prima facie, of an inability to make decisions. In the 
Court’s view, although persons who suffer mental illnesses usually have difficulties to 
decide or to communicate such decisions, their will should be take into account because it 
is a manifestation of their self-determination and, on a fundamental level, of their dignity” 
(Constitutional Court, 2009, para. 6). However, in this same decision, the Court held that 
it should not be the guardian who decided whether to place the person in question in a care 
home or not, but a council formed by relatives of the person with a disability. The relatives 
would have to make a decision following a best-interest approach. This was held even 
12 This program is called “Contigo”, which means, “With you”. It was created via the Persons with Disability 
Act 2012, Law 29973. The article in question states: “Article 59. Noncontributory pensions for severe 
disabilities Persons with severe disabilities living in poverty, in accordance to the criteria of the Household 
Targeting System (SISFOH) and who do not have a pension or income from public or private sectors, receive 
a noncontributory pension from the State. The health directorates will provide the certificate of severe 
disability and CONADIS will register them. The regulations establish the requirements and conditions to 
progressively access this benefit.” Translation retrieved from: http://www.internationaldisabilityalliance.
org/sites/default/files/documents/peru_general_law_on_persons_with_disabilities.english.pdf
13 The directive is available at: http://www.juntos.gob.pe/modulos/autorizaciones/normativa/
PROCEDIMIENTO_DE_AUTORIZACION_DE_COBRO.pdf. Published on May 2nd 2018.
14 Constitutional Court of Peru. Decision on case N° 2313-2009-HC/TC. September 24th 2009, para. 4. 
Available at: https://tc.gob.pe/jurisprudencia/2009/02313-2009-HC.pdf
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though the person with a disability in question had expressed her desire to leave the care 
home, essentially ignoring that person’s will.15 At no point of the discussion did the Court 
make any mention to the obligation that stems from Article 12, or the CRPD. Not only did 
the Court ignore Article 12, but it openly opted for a decision that opposed the article’s 
provisions. Only recently did the Constitutional Court16 recognize the importance of legal 
capacity of persons with disabilities, in consonance with Legislative Decree 1384 (2014).
Nevertheless, at the trial court level, there have been some notable advances. In 
2014, Judge Jorge Ramírez Niño de Guzmán ruled that a guardianship process against a 
person with psychosocial disability had serious violations of due process and thus nullified 
the process.17 However, this decision was not justified on the basis of CRPD obligations. 
The judge arrived at his ruling mainly because during the initial guardianship process, the 
person with disability had not been allowed to choose his own lawyer or provide proof or 
testimony. The decision was confirmed on appeal in 2018.18
In 2015, Judge Edwin Béjar – who happens to be the first and only blind judge 
in Peru – argued that the guardianship regime was not legal, as it contradicted Article 
12 of the CRPD.19 Therefore, he ruled that a guardian should not be appointed to two 
brothers with intellectual disabilities, and ordered the National Office of Pensions not to 
require a guardianship ruling in order to award the brothers their pension, even though 
before the Reform, providing a guardianship decision to access a pension was a statutory 
requirement. The judgment also created a “temporary supported decision-making system” 
specifically for the two brothers. Their mother, sister, and the court’s social services team: 
a coordinator, psychiatrist, psychologist and social worker were all parties in this system. 
Additionally, judge Béjar provided an easy-to-read version of the decision. It is important 
to note that requiring a guardianship ruling in order to award a pension is now expressly 
prohibited by Legislative Decree 1384.20 However, the decision was overturned by the 
Superior Court in 2015.21 After Judge Béjar tried the case once again and arrived at the 
same ruling, the ruling was declared null by the Supreme Court in 2017.22
15 According to Article 619 of the Civil Code prior to the Reform, the Family Council looks out for the 
interests of incapable adults without parents.
16 Constitutional Court of Peru. Decision on case N° 0194-2014-HC/TC, April 30th 2019. Available at: 
https://tc.gob.pe/jurisprudencia/2019/00194-2014-HC.pdf
17 Second Constitutional Court of Lima. Decision in case N° 25158- 2013-0-1801-JR-CI-02.
18 Third Civil Trial Court of Lima. Decision in in case N° 25158-2013-0-1801-JR-CI-02. Retrieved from: 
https://static.legis.pe/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Sala-confirma-capacidad-jur%C3%ADdica-de-persona-
con-exquizofrenia-Legis.pe_.pdf
19 Third Family Court of Cusco. Decision in case N° 01305-2012-0-1001-JR-FC-03. Available at: http://
www.gacetajuridica.com.pe/envios-laley/SENTENCIA-CUSCO1.pdf
20 The second transitional complementary provision is as follows: “Elimination of the requirement 
of interdiction.- All public and/or private entities adapt their administrative procedures, under their 
responsibility, within a period not greater than one hundred and twenty (120) calendar days, counting from 
the day following the publication of the Decree in the Official Gazette El Peruano.” (Own translation).
21 Civil Chamber of the Superior Court of Justice of Cusco. Decision N° 38 in case N° 01305-2012-0-1001-JR-
FC-03. Available at: www.pucp.edu.pe/6yXXyn
22 Permanente Constitutional and Social Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. Decision in file N° 1833-
2017. Available at: https://static.legis.pe/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Exp.-1833-2017-Cusco-Legis.pe_.pdf
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3. legal caPacIty In the reform
The reform was ultimately passed in September of 2018 via Legislative Decree 
1384. This decree modified and repealed norms in the Civil Code 1984 and the Code of Civil 
Procedure 1993 to introduce a supported decision-making system in Peru. Fundamentally, 
the Decree eliminated provisions in the articles 43 and 44 of the Civil Code 1984 that 
allowed for substituted decision-making regimes (via guardianship rulings) in the cases 
of persons with mental disabilities.23 The Civil Code 1984 was reformed to recognize full 
legal capacity to persons with disabilities who, except for certain cases, can freely appoint 
supports and safeguards through judicial or notary procedures.
For those “difficult cases” referred to previously, the reformed Code establishes the 
possibility of “compulsory supports”. That is to say that when a person cannot communicate 
their will, even after all efforts (including measures of accessibility and reasonable 
adjustments) to understand it have been exhausted, a judge can appoint supports and 
safeguards to protect or exercise the rights of said person, by request of any third party. 
According to the reformed Civil Code 1984, any natural or juridical person can be designated 
as a supporter, and supporters can be designated for specific acts, in the present or in the 
future. As I shall further explain in the following sections of this paper, the reform establishes 
a compulsory safeguard, and leaves open the possibility to create other safeguards.
The first issue the new law addresses the determination of persons who have 
legal capacity. The Legislative Decree eliminates any ground for guardianship based 
on disabilities. However, restrictions on legal capacity remain. Five sets of people will 
still be subject to guardianship: habitual drunkards, drug addicts, persons with criminal 
convictions, bad administrators and spendthrifts. While these sets of people were always 
subject to guardianship, the Legislative Decree added another ground: persons in a coma 
without a previously appointed supported decision-making system. In order to clarify 
some definitions, I will briefly state that bad administrators are those who have lost more 
than half of their assets due to bad administration, and prodigals are those who have spent 
most of their money so as to endanger their own existence or the ones dependent on them. 
The categories that have been removed are people who are “mentally retarded”24 and 
“people with mental impairment that does not allow them to express their free will”, both 
of which were directed towards persons with disabilities.
The multi-party Bill had proposed the elimination of all of restrictions on legal 
capacity. However, the Legislative Decree ultimately eliminated only those guardianships 
23 The Code referred to persons with intellectual and psychosocial disabilities as “mentally retarded”, 
“incapable of discernment” and people with “mental deterioration that does not allow them to freely express 
their will”.
24 “Retarded” is usually considered an insult to persons with intellectual disabilities. In United States, it may 
even amount to hate speech. On 2010, President Obama signed into law Pub. L. 111-256, usually known 
as Rosa’s Law. Said statute substitutes the terms “intellectual disability” and “individual with intellectual 
disability” for “mental retardation” and “mentally retarded” in all federal health, education and labor policy 
statutes, due to the stigma associated to these terms. However, it is the exact translation of the term in 
Spanish.
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directly related to disability.25 This has been criticized because some of the remaining 
reasons could have an adverse impact on persons with disabilities. Persons with disabilities 
could have episodes of addiction that could lead others to classify them as “habitual 
drunkards” or a “drug addict”. A person with disability who spends a lot of money or has 
a gambling addiction could also be classified as a “bad administrator” or a “spendthrift”.
The next question that arises is whether people who currently have guardians, will 
automatically have legal capacity with the publication of the reform. During the Bill’s 
negotiations, this was a highly discussed topic: is it really possible to restore legal capacity 
via a law? What happens if someone really needs a strong support that is very similar to a 
guardianship? The Decree decided to preserve existing guardianships. This probably has 
a lot to do with the disruptive effect that the total elimination of guardianships could have 
in the certainty of legal transactions. However, it is interesting to note that there currently 
are guardianships with no clear legal basis in Peru. As the people under guardianship age, 
these should naturally become extinct from the system. Also, the existing guardianships 
have been dealt with in two ways. The first path derives from Legislative Decree 1384 – 
the Decree that implemented the reform. According to its norms, any party can request 
the reversal of the interdiction of persons with disabilities, issued prior to the entry into 
force of the Reform, to be substituted by the designation of supports and safeguards.26 
The article allows for any party to request a reversal, not necessarily someone close to the 
person with a disability or someone with a legitimate interest.
Another interesting issue is the consequences of the reversal. Even though the 
logical consequence would have been the reversal of the guardianship, the Decree opted 
for the transformation of a guardianship regime into a supported decision-making regime. 
This means that guardianship will not be immediately overturned, but rather the person 
in question will have to go through a process designed to provide supports or safeguards. 
The Decree was not clear on what would happen if the person does not desire supports 
or safeguards. However, the Judiciary’s Transition Rules 046-2019-CE-PJ27 state that the 
person has the right to reject supports and safeguards.
The second way to deal with current guardianships was proposed in 2019, through 
the Judiciary’s Transition Rules 046-2019-CE-PJ. According to these rules, judges have 
the duty to promote the renewal of proceedings to revert or transform guardianship rulings 
25 The article in question reads as follows: “Article 564.- Persons subject to curatorship. The persons referred 
to in Article 44 paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 are subjected to curatorship.” (Own translation).
26 The second final supplementary provision reads as follows: “Second. Restoration of the capacity to act of 
the interdicted persons. Any person can request the reversal of the interdiction of persons with disabilities, 
issued prior to the entry into force of this law, by the designation of supports and safeguards.” (Own 
translation).
27 Article 3.2.d of the Administrative Resolution, published on February 12th 2019, reads as follows: “In 
case the person with disability indicates that he/she does not require supports, the legal capacity will be 
reinstituted, leaving the guardianship and the appointment of the guardian without effect and concluding the 
process.” (Own translation).
Resolución Administrativa 046-2019-CE-PJ. Aprueban el “Reglamento de Transición al Sistema de Apoyos 
en Observancia al Modelo Social de la Discapacidad”.
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or procedures. The transformation of a guardianship ruling or procedure into a procedure 
to designate supports can only happen with the person’s consent, except in the cases of 
compulsory designation of supports. This Decree also deals with on-going guardianship 
processes. When it comes to these, judges are ordered to transform these to supports and 
safeguard designation processes if the person so wishes or cease proceedings if the person 
does not wish to appoint supports.28
In conclusion, even with the Reform, it is possible that some people with disabilities 
will remain under guardianship and that some will have guardianships imposed on 
them in the future for reasons that may have a disproportionate impact on persons with 
disabilities. It is critical to clearly assess the disproportionate impact of certain regulations 
on guardianship that are not directly related to disability. Another concern to address is 
the best solution for existing guardianships. The complete and immediate elimination may 
be a complicated objective. However, it will be interesting to see what replacements for 
guardianship will arise and whether a general response could be applicable to all (or most).
Another important aspect are liability rules regarding the supporter or supporters. The 
Civil Code 1984 now states that supporters are not directly liable for the acts of the person 
that receives the support.29 However, a person with a disability will be able to make a claim 
against their supports if they believe they have been ill advised on an issue. We will touch 
on the concept of “ill advised” in the following sections. Here, it is important to note that the 
referred article does not establish a standard under which supporters would be held liable.
The article regarding liability mentions the “intent or fault” standard, but only for 
the supporters of persons in coma. Therefore, there is no clear standard to evaluate whether 
a claim against a supporter would be valid in other cases. Would the “intent or fault” 
standard still be applicable? How should the standard be applied? Should the standard be 
objective and, therefore, based on a definite set of rules and principles applicable to all 
persons providing support? Or should it be subjective and, therefore, different supporters 
could be liable in different ways, accounting for their particular circumstances? In that 
case, for example, a lawyer providing support would have a different standard of liability 
from that of a person with no formal education. Judges in a diverse country like Peru should 
probably take into account the context and characteristics of a person before establishing 
any liability. Thus, I am in favor of a subjective approach in this matter.
28 The transitional complementary provision reads as follows: “First.- Transition to the system of supports 
and safeguards: The Judge transforms the following processes into one of supports and safeguards: […] b) 
Those ongoing proceedings of interdiction, initiated prior to the entry into force of this law. In these cases, 
the processing of the proceedings is suspended and the rules established in Chapter Four to Title II of the 
Fourth Section of Book III of the Civil Code apply. The Executive Council of the Judiciary establishes 
the rules and procedures necessary for the correct functioning of the transition to the system of support in 
mandatory compliance with the social model of disability.” (Own translation)
29 The article in question reads as follows: “Article 1976-A.- Responsibility of the person with support. The 
person who receives support is responsible for their decisions, including those made with such support, with 
the right to make a claim against them. Persons included in article 44 provision 9 are not responsible for 
decisions taken with judicially designated support that were carried out with intent or fault.”
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4. suPPort In the reform
The term support in the context of supported decision-making can mean many 
things.30 It can mean accessibility measures for some people, or accommodations regarding 
time to decide. But it usually means mechanisms that help people with disabilities to arrive 
to a decision or to communicate such decision. For example, they can include: “formalized 
support for decision-making; shared or co-decision-making; appointing a representative 
to make decisions; and forms of advance planning such as advance directives and Ulysses 
directives” (Del Villar, 2015, p. 189).
In most cases, people will rely on supported decision making. Dinerstein defines 
this as:
“a series of relationships, practices, arrangements, and agreements, 
of more or less formality and intensity, designed to assist an individual 
with a disability to make and communicate to others decisions about the 
individual’s life. Some of the above alternatives to guardianship could 
be part of a supported decision-making regime, though, to the extent 
they involve the individual with a disability identifying someone else as 
authorized to speak for him or her, they can move into a form of substituted 
decision-making (albeit one that is less restrictive of the individual’s liberty 
than guardianship). A purer form of supported decision-making would rely 
on peer support (for example, ex-users of psychiatric services for people 
with psycho-social disabilities), community support networks and personal 
assistance, so-called natural supports (family, friends), or representatives 
(pursuant to a representation agreement) to speak with, rather than for, the 
individual with a disability” (Dinerstein, 2012, p. 10).
Thus, succinctly, supported decision making can help a person with disability 
to “(a) obtain and understand information, (b) evaluate the possible alternatives and 
consequences of a decision, (c) express and communicate a decision, and/or (d) implement 
a decision.” (Devandas, 2017, para. 41).
Undoubtedly, one of the big triumphs of this Reform is the recognition of supports 
for the exercise of legal capacity.31 We must note that the definition of supports employed 
30 The text of article 12(3) reads as follows: “States Parties shall take appropriate measures to provide access 
by persons with disabilities to the support they may require in exercising their legal capacity”.
31 The text of article 659-B of the Peruvian Civil Code 1984 now reads as follows: “Supports are forms 
of assistance freely chosen by a person of legal age to facilitate the exercise of their rights, including 
support in communication, in the understanding of legal acts and their consequences, and the expression and 
interpretation of the will of the one who requires the support.
The support has no powers of representation except in cases where this is expressly established by decision 
of the person in need of support or by the judge in the case of Article 659-E.
When the support requires interpreting the will of the person who is being assisted, the criterion of the best 
interpretation of the will applies, taking into account the life trajectory of the person, previous expressions of 
will in similar contexts, the information provided by trusted people of the assisted person, the consideration 
of their preferences and any other consideration relevant to the specific case.”
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in CRPD Committee’s General Comment 1 was too broad and did not help States on 
how to legislate their implementation. The Peruvian Decree overcomes this problem 
by indicating that supports are “forms of assistance freely chosen by a person of legal 
age to facilitate the exercise of their rights, including support in communication, in the 
understanding of legal acts and their consequences, and the expression and interpretation 
of the will of the one who requires the support” (article 659-B). In this section we will try 
to provide some insight on how supports work within this Reform.
The Decree states that the role of a support “can fall on one or more natural persons, 
public institutions or non-profit legal entities, specialized both in the matter and duly 
registered” (article 659-C). This means that support can also be provided by an institution, 
given that it is a non-profit institution. It is both interesting and important that enterprises 
have not been allowed to offer “decision-making support services”. It is not clear why this 
should not be possible, especially when Peruvian legislation, as I will explain later, has not 
developed provisions regarding conflicts of interest in this matter.
In accordance with CRPD Committee’s General Comment 1, the Decree does not 
allow the imposition of supports in most cases (2014, para. 19). However, this may create 
some complex situations. What would happen if a person needs a support to understand 
certain contracts but does not want one? Should that person be entitled to the “dignity 
of risk” understanding? (Gooding, 2013, p. 435-436) That concept explains that persons 
with disabilities have to be allowed to make risky decisions because it is part of all human 
beings’ dignity and self-realization. For these situations, I will provide some ideas about 
safeguards below.
5. the excePtIonal case of judIcIally desIgnated suPPorters
One of the strongest arguments against the Reform was based on the “difficult 
cases”. This is how some people in the Parliament called persons with severe impairments 
that made understanding or communication almost impossible. For those cases, the Reform 
included Article 659-E. This article deals with persons who cannot express their will even 
“after having made real, considerable and pertinent efforts to obtain an expression of will 
from the person and having provided them with measures of accessibility and reasonable 
accommodations” (article 659-E, own translation). In those cases, any third party can 
petition a judge to designate supports. In these cases, unlike regular cases where the person 
with disability will make the decision, the judge will design and designate the supports. 
According to the Decree, this exceptional judicial designation can only be applied after 
the judge has “made real, considerable and pertinent efforts to obtain an expression of will 
from the person and having provided them with measures of accessibility and reasonable 
accommodations” (article 659-E, own translation). In selecting the supporter(s) the 
judge must take “into account the relationship of cohabitation, trust, friendship, care or 
kinship that exists between them and the person that requires support (article 659-E, own 
translation).
One valid question follows from this norm: can a “functional approach” test 
be justified in these situations, in order to know what accommodations or measures of 
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accessibility a person would need? Asking this question does not ignore that the functional 
approach is not free of criticism. As Series has said, the approach may be arbitrary, invasive 
and, mainly, “will penalize those with impairments which affect their communication or 
interpersonal functioning, or those merely lacking self-confidence or trust in their capacity 
assessor” (Series, 2014). Therefore, it is important to engage and analyze the functionality 
of the person with disability, not to eliminate their legal capacity but to be certain of what 
kind of supports are most appropriate in each particular case.
One might argue that the person providing support for someone who does not 
communicate is, in practical terms, a ‘substitute decision-making regime’. To respond 
to the argument, we have to assess where the judicially appointed support systems fall 
within the scope of the CRPD Committee’s definition of substitute decision-making. 
The Committee’s definition of substitute decision making incorporates three elements: 
(i) removal of legal capacity; (ii) the appointment of a substitute decision maker by a third 
party; or (iii) the decisions are made based on the “best interest” of the person instead 
of their will and preferences (2014, para. 27).32 However, the CRPD Committee has not 
clearly established if each of these conditions, on its own, is enough for a situation to 
qualify as a substitute decision making situation or there would have to be at least two for 
this to happen (Martin et. al., 2016, pp. 63-66).
In the Peruvian case, the provisions of articles 659-D and 659-E33 would match 
the first two elements mentioned. Applying these provisions would mean removing legal 
capacity and leaving the appointment in the hands of a judge, but the decisions will still 
be made based on the will and preferences of the person with disability. This means that, 
if the three conditions have to be cumulatively met in order for a regime to qualify as 
substitute decision-making, the Peruvian Reform has eliminated these. But if only one 
or two conditions have to be met in order for a situation to qualify as such, it is clear that 
the Peruvian Reform, and probably any future reform in the world, will keep substitute 
decision-making regimes. Under that interpretation, even emergency health care would 
32 See also: CRPD Committee. 2014. General comment No. 1 (2014) Article 12: Equal recognition before 
the law. Eleventh Session, 19 May 2014. Corrigendum on Paragraph 27. CRDP/C/GC/1/Corr.1.
33 The provisions in the articles mentioned read as follows: “Article 659-D.- Designation of supports. The 
person of legal age who requires support for the exercise of their legal capacity can appoint their support 
before a notary or a competent judge.”
“Artículo 659–E.- Exception for the judicial appointment of supports. A judge can, exceptionally, appoint 
the necessary supports for persons with disabilities who cannot manifest their will and for those persons 
with restricted juridical capacity, in conformity with article 44, numeral 9. This measure will be justified 
after having placed real, considerable and pertinent efforts in place to obtain a manifestation of will from 
the person, having used measures of accessibility and reasonable adjustments, and when it is necessary for 
the exercise or protection of said person’s rights.
The judge determines the person o persons to be appointed as supports considering the existing relationships 
of cohabitation, trust, friendship or parentage between the persons to be appointed and the person who needs 
supports. Likewise, the judge determines the term, reach and responsibilities of the supports. In all cases, 
the judge must adopt the necessary diligences to obtain the best possible interpretation of the will and the 
preferences of the person in question and consider their life trajectory. Persons who have been convicted 
of sexual or domestic violence cannot appointed as supports. The judicial process to appoint supports can 
exceptionally be initiated by any person with legal capacity.” (Own translation).
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amount to substitute decision-making. As some have said, that approach is “too extreme” 
(Martin and Gurbai, 2019, p. 118) and, thus, inadmissible.
6. safeguards In the reform
Safeguards are one of the least developed issues in legal capacity literature. Even 
the CRPD Committee’s General Comment devoted only three paragraphs to this aspect 
(2019, para. 20-22). The Peruvian Decree defines safeguards as “measures to guarantee 
respect for the rights, will and preferences of the person receiving support, prevent 
abuse and undue influence on the part of the person providing such support as well as 
avoiding harm or putting at risk the rights of the persons assisted” (article 659-G, author’s 
translation). On the other hand, CRPD’s article 12.4 indicates that safeguards must ensure 
that supports “respect the rights, will and preferences of the person, are free of conflict of 
interest and undue influence”. Table No. 1 sums up the differences between Article 12’s 
provisions, and the terms of the Reform:
table no. 1: comparison between safeguards according to CRPD and the Peruvian 
reform Decree.
Topic Safeguards according to  Article 12.4 Safeguards in the Reform
Aim Prevent abuse in accordance with 
international human rights law
“prevent abuse” (Art. 659-E)
Persons subject to 
safeguards
Any person receiving support Can only be proposed by the 
person receiving support or in the 
case of judicially-mandated support 
(Art. 659-E)
Limits to measures 
relating to the 
exercise of legal 
capacity
Respect the rights, will and 
preferences of the person.
Respect “for the rights, will and 
preferences of the person receiving 
support” (Art. 659-E) and “avoiding 
harm or putting at risk the rights of the 
persons assisted.” (Art. 659-E)
Limits regarding 
the person 
providing the 
support
They have to be free of conflict of 
interest and undue influence.
Safeguards prevent undue influence 
(Art. 659-E)
Persons convicted of family violence or 
sexual violence cannot be supports
Judicial limits Proportional and tailored to the 
person’s circumstances, apply for the 
shortest time possible
At least time limits
Judicial review Subject to regular review by 
a competent, independent and 
impartial authority or judicial body.
Judges review the safeguards
Proportionality The safeguards shall be proportional 
to the degree to which such measures 
affect the person’s rights and 
interests.
No reference
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One of the main differences has to do with the procedures through which safeguards 
are appointed. According to the Reform, judges can only impose safeguards on persons 
subject to the exceptional designation of supports by judges of the Article 659-E. That 
norm is designed only for when a person with a disability cannot express their will at all, 
so there is an evident need to designate a support. However, if the Peruvian Reform is 
to comply with international standards, safeguards should apply to any person receiving 
support. In the opinion of Martínez-Pujalte, the Peruvian Reform fails to adequately prevent 
“manipulation, abuse or undue influence” (2019, p. 18). Even though he recognizes this 
pitfall of the Reform, he argues that this is the “first regulation of legal capacity compliant 
with the Convention” (2019, p. 15). I have to disagree with this last point. Peru’s regulation 
may be the regulation closest to compliance all around the globe, but if it does not comply 
with Article 12.4, then we cannot say that it is fully CRPD compliant.
Just recently, Legislative Decree 1384’s Statute 016-2019-MIMP was enacted.34  
This document provides little guidance on the application of the Reform. Regarding 
safeguards, there is an open-ended list of measures that can be taken like: providing 
accountability for the administration of property, audits, unexpected supervision, 
unexpected visits, hearings with the supporter or other persons close to the person 
receiving support and requiring information to public or private institutions (article 21). It 
does not seem as enough, especially if they can only be imposed in the exceptional cases. 
Additionally, these measures are ex-post. They do not prevent the abuse from happening. 
They may alert the judge about it. These creates two problems. First, safeguards should 
create ex-ante protections. This way, a support should be impeded to advise in transactions 
that may benefit her. A support should also have clear indications if she is going to make 
a manifestation of will: not selling under certain price, for example. The second problem 
that arises is that the ex-post measures do not specify how will they engage with juridical 
acts. If a judge notices an undue influence, there is no clear way if the juridical act can be 
nullified or not.
It is also important to note that one of the safeguards that has been imposed by 
the reform has to do with the history of the supporter. By virtue of article 659-E of 
the reformed Civil Code 1984, persons who have been convicted for family violence 
or sexual violence cannot be designated as supporters.35 This is inconsistent with the 
idea that anyone requesting supports has the right to choose the “form, identity, scope, 
duration and number of supports”.36 In my opinion, however, a judge can validly limit 
34 The statute was enacted via Decreto Supremo 016-2019-MIMP, Decreto Supremo que aprueba el 
Reglamento que regula el otorgamiento de ajustes razonables, designación de apoyos e implementación 
de salvaguardias para el ejercicio de la capacidad jurídica de las personas con discapacidad, published on 
August 25th 2019.
35 The relevant portion of the article reads as follows: “[…] Persons convicted of family violence or persons 
convicted of sexual violence cannot be designated as supporters. […]”. (Own translation).
36 The relevant portion of the article reads as follows: “The person requesting the supports determines their 
form, identity, scope, duration and number of supports. The support can fall on one or more natural persons, 
public institutions or non-profit legal entities, specialized both in the matter and duly registered.” (Own 
translation).
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said right. In many cases, the prohibition of persons convicted for family violence 
or sexual violence would be enough, but in other cases it will not be. One example 
would the case of persons convicted for embezzlement. In my opinion, the whole 
idea of safeguard seems to relate to a kind of paternalism that would be justified 
to avoid the abuse. This would allow the judge to decide who can and cannot be a 
provider of support. In any case, what will be necessary is for judges to develop a clear 
jurisprudence on how to implement these safeguards. This jurisprudence will have 
to consider the question that Piers Gooding posed: “How can the legal regulation of 
people’s intimate lives be kept to an absolute minimum while still retaining effective 
safeguards against abuse?” (2013, p. 442).
7. the reform In current PrIvate law theory
The experience of the Reform was complicated because only a few Private Law 
academics or practitioners participated in the debate on legal capacity.37 I think that many 
of them could not conceive an approach to supported decision making, but I also think 
that many of them failed to realize how article 12 and the legal capacity reform affect the 
traditional theory of the juridical act.
7.1. The Juridical Act in Private Law
In civil law jurisdictions, there is a general theory of the juridical act (Schmidt, 2012, 
p. 1016). According to private law doctrine, the essence of the juridical act is a “declaration 
by one or more parties intended to create a legal effect” (Schmidt, 2012, p. 1016). This 
theory encompasses any expression of will that creates a legal relationship: contract, 
marriage, will, recognition of child, etc. Thus, will is a key element in understanding all 
of private law in civil law jurisdictions.
However, will can be understood in different ways. According to “Savigny’s will 
theory, the basis for the validity is the intention of the person making the declaration” 
(Schmidt, 2012, p. 1017). This means that if the intention was deficiently expressed (for 
any reason), the person cannot be bound by the declaration. This led to criticism, as it is 
dangerous when thinking about the level of legal certainty required for commercial affairs. 
On the other hand, the theory of declaration analyzes will based on the level of reliance 
provided by the person receiving the declaration. According to Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
“the making of a contract depends not on the agreement of two minds in one intention, 
but on the agreement of two sets of external signs — not on the parties’ having meant the 
same things but on their having said the same thing” (1897, p. 7). As I will develop later, 
this theory can be of the utmost importance when dealing with the declaration of will of 
a person with disabilities. What should be taken into account when analyzing a contract? 
The real will of the person or the declaration that he or she made? And what effect does 
that have in persons with disabilities?
37 One of the few examples I remember is an event at the Congress with the participation of professors 
Leysser León and Carlos Fernández Sessarego. See: (CONGRESO DE LA REPÚBLICA DE PERÚ, 2017)
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7.2. Some examples of the interaction of the doctrine of juridical act and Article 12
Academics have yet to analyze how the theory of juridical act will engage with the 
provisions of Article 12. For now, it is safe to say that a juridical act is an exercise of legal 
capacity and active legal capacity is the ability to exercise juridical acts.38 This ability 
needs to be inclusive to persons with disabilities. In the following pages, I offer a glimpse 
on what issues may arise and some proposals to overcome them.
7.2.1. Error
According to juridical act theory, when there is an essential error, there is no 
agreement, and therefore, there is no juridical act (Sefton-Green, 2005, p. 6). What would 
happen with this theory in cases regarding persons with disabilities? It is a fact that many 
legal theories were designed excluding persons with disabilities (Kittay, 2003). Nowadays, 
there is an urgent need to reassess those theories to make them disability inclusive, and to 
make them respond to the issues that will arise from implementing Article 12 compliant 
systems in civil law jurisdictions.
What is an error? According to Schermaier, at least in European continental 
jurisdictions, an error “enables the mistaken party to free himself from a given declaration 
of intent, a promise or a contract - provided certain conditions have been fulfilled” (Sefton-
Green, 2005, p. 39). In Peru, in order for an error to make a contract voidable, it must be 
essential and must be recognizable by the other party. This can lead to complex situations 
with persons with disabilities.
Consider the following example:39 Jose has a mild intellectual disability and 
paranoia (usually not visible tor most people) and loves comic books and characters. He 
enters a comic book store, sees a golden gauntlet and exclaims “The Infinity Gauntlet!”. 
He asks the salesperson if this is the real Infinity Gauntlet from the Marvel Comics. She 
says it is, because she thinks he is referring to whether it is a fake or an original piece. He 
decides to buy it, thinking it is the real Infinity Gauntlet. Later, he talks to his brother and 
realizes this is not a “real” Infinity Gauntlet. What is the correct legal response in this case, 
with regards both to private law theory and the social model of disability? Did the clerk 
have a duty to inform the customer that the product was not, stricto sensu, the literally 
real Infinity Gauntlet? Could she have known what Jose understood as “real”? Could 
Jose receive a refund for his purchase? In this situation, the debate between Savigny and 
Holmes’s views becomes relevant. Which will would be relevant to the Law – the authentic 
will, or the declared will?
38 This idea was proposed to me by Wayne Martin.
39 I arrived at the idea for this hypothetical case with the input of Saulo Galicia.
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Let us add further difficulty to this case. Peru’s Legislative Decree 1384 
provides that supporters have to be registered in public records.40 This means that 
anybody will have access to this information. So, let us imagine that, in the case, the 
clerk notices the disability, reviews the public record and finds that this person has 
supporters. Is the person free to use them when he wants to? Can the clerk deny the 
sale on the grounds that the client has a support and require him to use it? This could 
be important if we consider that a mistake could lead to the annulment of the sale. 
For example, in the case of the proposed Reform to the Hungarian Civil Code (not in 
force), the support “shall attach his/her signature to a legal declaration to confirm that 
s/he was present at the making of such a legal statement, and he or she provided assistance 
[sic] the supported person”. That would definitely be an imposition, but some might feel 
it is acceptable so long as it protects the validity of the agreement. In the same pace, the 
current Colombian Reform has also determined the need of the supporter to provide the 
support she was intended to give. However, the final decision remains in the person with 
disability.41
Actors in the legal system - lawyers, notaries, salesclerks or police officers - have 
few clues on what to do in cases of persons that need support.42 The UN CRPD Committee 
has stated that, in order to comply with Article 12, reforms must provide a “mechanism 
for third parties to challenge the action of a support person if they believe that the support 
person is not acting in accordance with the will and preferences of the person concerned” 
(2014, para. 29.d). In the Peruvian Reform, there is no provision on how third parties 
must act if they suspect a supporter is not correctly fulfilling his or her duties, much less a 
mechanism for them to challenge said actions.
On this topic, it is also important to acknowledge that notaries will have to make 
significant efforts to adapt their practice to the reform. Although notaries are not, stricto 
sensu, part of the juridical act, they do fulfill a crucial role in certifying the “capacity, 
40 The relevant article reads as follows: “Article 2030. Registered acts and resolutions.
Registered in this Registry are: […] 1.- Resolutions or public deeds in which the designation of supports and 
safeguards of natural persons is established or modified. […]
9. Resolutions that designate the guardian or the support and those that revoke them. […]
41 ARTICLE 19 of the Act 1996 of 2019. Support agreements as a requirement for the validity of juridical 
acts.
The person entitled to perform a juridical act with a valid and current support agreement for the celebration 
of specific juridical acts, must use the designated supports when celebrating the act, as a requirement of its 
validity.
In consequence, if the person entitled to perform the juridical acts carries out the juridical acts specified in 
the support agreement, without using the stipulated supports, this will be cause for relative invalidity of the 
act, following the general rules of the civil legal regime.
PARAGRAPH. The above disposition cannot be interpreted as an obligation of the person entitled to 
perform a juridical act to act according to the will of the person or persons providing support. In accordance 
to article 4, numeral 3 of this Law, supports must respect the will and preferences of the person entitled to 
perform the juridical act, as well as respect their right to take risks and make mistakes.
42 It is important to note that CRPD Article 13(2) reads as follows: “In order to help to ensure effective 
access to justice for persons with disabilities, States Parties shall promote appropriate training for those 
working in the field of administration of justice, including police and prison staff.”
The Age of Human Rights Journal, 14 (June 2020) pp. 155-180  ISSN: 2340-9592 DOI: 10.17561/tahrj.v14.5482 173
Renato antonio Constantino CayCho
freedom and knowledge” of the parties to the act (Article 54.h of Notary Act, Legislative 
Decree 1049 2008). It is not clear how notaries will address the abilities of a person with 
disability in this new context. Nowadays, capacity cannot be grounds for the denial of the 
act of a person with a disability. But following this premise, how should we assess freedom 
to choose? What happens if a notary suspects that a person with disability is acting under 
undue influence? Should they refuse to certify the act? What would the consequences be? 
I will explore some of these situations in the ‘undue influence’ section of this document.
As mentioned before, we need to reassess every general theory of the law in light 
of the social model of disability. By disregarding the functional approach for granting 
legal capacity, the CRPD Committee has disregarded some traditional tenets of private 
law. Even though we may disagree with the premise, many legal institutions work on 
the presumption of a certain “regular” brain functionality. The doctrine of error is useful 
insofar as it allows a person to distance herself from something “they may not have 
intended” (Series, 2014).
7.2.2. Conflict of interest
Article 12.4’s standard creates a significant problem when assessing CRPD 
compliance of the Peruvian reform, because the Decree does not include any provisions with 
regards to “conflict of interest”. I hold that a conflict of interest happens as a given situation 
when a person’s interest may interfere with their duties (Martin et. al., 2016, p. 49). Usually, 
lawyers are tempted to solve conflict of interest by eliminating or disclosing them. However, 
that is not the standard of Article 12.4. In fact, if we follow Article 12.4, the supporter’s duty 
should be to manage the conflict of interest, not so to avoid it (Martin et. al., 2016, p. 49).
How can we ensure that the supporters are “free of conflict of interest”, when they 
are usually close to the person with a disability? Let us present an example: Barbara has 
a mild intellectual disability and appoints her mother as her support. She does not think 
of any need for safeguard, especially because she is not quite sure about their necessity 
or convenience. However, a few months later she opens a bank account and the clerk 
offers her the possibility to sign an insurance contract in favor of a third party. When she 
asks what this means exactly, the clerk says it will give money to a person of her choice 
if something happens to her. Later on, she decides that she wants to write her will, so she 
goes to a notary. In Peru, the Civil Code 1974 requires a witness to the will, who cannot 
also be a beneficiary of the will. Barbara wants to leave her mother some money.
In both cases, regarding the insurance and the will, can Barbara’s mother be her 
supporter? Article12.4 would seem to indicate that she could not be a supporter in these 
situations. The Decree says that safeguards only applies if a person asks for them, which 
makes no sense regarding the obligations of Article 12.4. Now, if a judge has not established 
any safeguards regarding conflict of interest, what should the clerk or the notary do?
Using the Decree, what should they do if they believe that the conflict of interest 
has led to abuse or undue influence? In this particular case, the Decree seems to not comply 
adequately with the standard of Article 12.4. Then again, there are no clear instructions 
The Age of Human Rights Journal, 14 (June 2020) pp. 155-180  ISSN: 2340-9592 DOI: 10.17561/tahrj.v14.5482 174
The flag of imaginaTion: Peru’s new reform on legal caPaciTy for Persons wiTh inTellecTual and 
Psychosocial disabiliTies and The need for new undersTandings in PrivaTe law
for the legal community on how to deal with the situation when they detect a support not 
working as it should. For example, using the previous example: under what circumstances 
would the clerk have to act?
One standard could be that a clerk –or any third party– has to act “in any situation 
that arises a conflict of interest”. That could create extreme difficulties for persons with 
disabilities in signing contracts, because supports are usually relatives or close friends. 
Another possibility is that the sole existence of the conflict of interest creates the duty of 
the third party to act. We could construct a two-fold standard: A third party has the duty 
to avoid the juridical act when the support of the person with disability has a conflict of 
interest and the decision seems to create an unfair advantage for the supporter that goes 
against the rights of the person with a disability. In the previous case, the conflict of 
interest would be irrelevant as it does not affect Barbara’s rights.
7.2.3. Undue influence
Common law has best developed the concept of undue influence. According to 
common law doctrine, undue influence is the use of any act of persuasion in order to 
overcome the free will and the judgment of another person (Lehman and Phelps, 2005). 
California statutory law provides three elements to be considered regarding undue 
influence: (i) vulnerability of the victim, (ii) the influencer’s apparent authority, (iii) the 
actions or tactics used by the influencer and (iv) the equity of the result (Section 15610.70 
of the Welfare and Institutions Code of California).
I will propose another example that demonstrates the difficulty in addressing 
this issue. Marina is person with a mild intellectual disability. She has two brothers: 
Alan and Hugo. Hugo has two children. Both Alan and Hugo are supports for Marina. 
However, Marina talks to Hugo more often because she lives near his house. One day, 
Hugo encourages Marina to write a will, telling her that it would be really useful for his 
children (her niece and nephew) if she could leave things for them. She likes this idea 
and asks if he knows any lawyer who could help. Hugo hires a lawyer and Marina writes 
a will benefiting Hugo’s children. The will explicitly states: “I came up with the idea of 
leaving all my things to my niece and nephew when my brother told me how useful that 
would be for their education”. When Alan finds out, after Marina passes away, he seeks 
the nullification of the will. Should his claim be successful?
Two problems come to mind when dealing with this situation. The first one has 
to with identifying situations that would amount to undue influence, and when undue 
influence should be grounds for an annulment or nullification of the juridical act. I 
propose that, in order to ask for a nullification, two criteria must be met: there has to 
be undue influence and such undue influence must damage the rights of the person.43 
I base this proposal on the case of Strickland v. Washington.44 In that case, the United 
States Supreme Court held that a defendant would have to establish two propositions to 
43 This idea arose in conversation with Robert Dinerstein.
44 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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demonstrate that legal counsel had been so defective that it would amount to ineffective 
assistance of counsel. According to the US Supreme Court, “First, the defendant must 
show that counsel’s performance was deficient. […] Second, the defendant must show that 
the deficient performance prejudiced the defense” (1984, para. 687). For our case, I would 
argue that, in order for undue influence to be a ground for annulment it has to meet two 
criteria: First, there has to be an undue influence that vitiates the real will of the person. 
Second, there has to be an actual damage to the rights of the person with disabilities. 
This would comply with the idea of Article 12.4. The first criterion protects the will and 
preferences, the second one, rights.
For the first criterion, I will use what George Szmukler called the “spectrum 
of treatment pressures” (2018, p. 151). Even though they were originally designed for 
treatment, I find them quite useful for these situations. The spectrum includes persuasion, 
interpersonal leverage, inducement, threats and compulsion. Compulsion and threats would 
be ground for the nullification of the juridical act by themselves, so it is not necessary to 
address them regarding undue influence. However, the three remaining items need to be 
carefully analyzed.
Persuasion goes beyond the mere facts and tries to “appeal to reason (and to some 
degree to the emotions)” (Szmukler, 2018, p. 154). However, it is also a part of common 
human relationships. We usually want to convince others around us that what we think is 
right and they should follow our advice. Thus, I would argue that, prima facie, persuasion 
would not amount to undue influence, but that that may change if persuasive techniques 
are applied constantly and consistently. In the case presented, persuasion was what Hugo 
used to convince Marina. However, that action does not seem like an imposition of Hugo’s 
will over Marina’s.
The situation would be much different if Hugo had had a plan to convince her and 
would try to impose this idea every time he saw Marina. Interpersonal leverage means 
using a relationship as a source of pressure (Szmukler, 2018, p. 155). Comments such as 
“if you don’t do this, I will be very sad” and actions that reflect the same intent would 
amount to interpersonal leverage. Once again, prima facie, this does not look like undue 
influence by itself. However, if comments like these are made on a regular basis, they 
certainly might amount to it. Finally, offers or inducements would be considered a form of 
undue influence, since they do not reflect the real will of the person. Of course, this is open 
for discussion. Persons without disabilities change their opinions all the time.
The second step would be to analyze whether or not there was any damage. In the 
case of Marina (and any other last will case), there is no ground for annulment. Whoever 
she had chosen as an heir made no difference to her rights, since the transfer of goods 
happens postmortem. Therefore, none of her rights are affected.
7.3. Preliminary conclusions
Both undue influence and conflict of interest raise the question of when should that 
be grounds for a request to nullify a will or a contract? I have provided some guidelines 
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when those situations arise. For these situations, Private Law has to change to adapt to 
the recognition of legal capacity of persons with disabilities. This recognition cannot be 
understood as an opportunity to “abandon or ignore people with disabilities who may 
be vulnerable to violence, abuse and exploitation” (Arstein-Kerslake and Flynn, 2016, 
p. 479). It has to be understood as an opportunity change the current understanding of 
certain core issues in Private Law, like the concept of will. That exercise also has to 
include the creation of safeguards that protect the person from different situations. Some 
of them will be an expansion of previous institutions, like the error. But some others may 
be new figures that need to be drafted in a way that is coherent with the rest of Private 
Law. That is the case of undue influence and conflicts of interest.
8. conclusIons
As others have stated, the journey of legal capacity of persons with disabilities 
has just begun (Arstein-Kerslake and Flynn, 2016, p. 471). There is no clear map, but we 
know we have a goal. So, we have to give it a try. States are trying to change their laws, 
but this process is quite difficult. There are no clear guidelines on how to reform a Civil 
Code 1984. Lawyers who specialize in Private Law (property, contracts and torts) are 
usually not keen to have a dialogue with human rights or disability lawyers. Many judges 
and notaries are against the recognition of legal capacity of persons with disabilities.45
But, against all odds, reforms happen. And it happened in Peru. I was a privileged 
witness to the process. I have been able to talk to judges, notaries, activists, relatives of 
persons with disabilities, academics and policy makers on this issue. I believe we need 
to be proud of this advancement. However, as academics, we have the urge to provide 
a coherent framework for understanding. That is something we need to come up with. 
Academics are trying to deliver disability-neutral understandings for consent (Brosnan 
and Flynn, 2017), State intervention (Flynn & Arstein-Kerslake, 2017; Gooding & Flynn, 
2015)) and care and autonomy (Feder Kittay, 2005, p. 8). Lawyers and academics from 
the Civil Law (Continental) tradition need to think about how the recognition of the legal 
capacity of persons with disability and the provision of support alter our view on the 
juridical act. We need to create a new understanding for will in our legal system that allows 
people with disabilities to marry, sign contracts, make a will or be part of an association. 
But that same understanding must enable people with disabilities to claim they made a 
mistake or that their will was coerced or under undue influence.
Finally, there is a crucial role for judges. They will be the ones in charge of 
drawing lines and applying the provisions of the Reform. They will also be in charge of 
filling in the gaps they may find in the legislation. It is important to note that, in some 
other jurisdictions, judges have understood supports as a new name for guardian (Iglesias 
Frecha, 2017). Therefore, there must be a public policy on how to apply the Reform,how 
to solve the issues that were not addressed in the legislation and on how to evaluate its 
implementation. Finally, I would like to recall that, around a hundred years ago, André 
45 I cannot provide specific data for this statement. However, I have participated in at least eight training 
sessions for judges. The auditorium is usually filled with critics of the reform.
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Breton said: “It is not the fear of madness which will oblige us to leave the flag of 
imagination furled” (Breton, 1972). We need to embrace that feeling. The consequences 
of the inclusion of madness and disability in Private Law are not to be feared. They should 
help us reframe our understanding of our will, our vulnerability and our humanity.
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